The 1983 Amendments to Pennsylvania\u27s Business Corporation Law: Unconstitutional? MITE Be by McDaniel, John S.
Volume 89 
Issue 2 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 89, 
1984-1985 
1-1-1985 
The 1983 Amendments to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation 
Law: Unconstitutional? MITE Be 
John S. McDaniel 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
John S. McDaniel, The 1983 Amendments to Pennsylvania's Business Corporation Law: Unconstitutional? 
MITE Be, 89 DICK. L. REV. 401 (1985). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol89/iss2/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 




The General Assembly of Pennsylvania has taken a bold step in
enacting major amendments (1983 Amendments)1 to Pennsylvania's
Business Corporation Law (BCL).2 The 1983 Amendments make
three substantive changes in the BCL. First, section 408(B) of the
1983 Amendments3 broadens the scope of the factors that manage-
ment may consider in the exercise of its fiduciary duties to the corpo-
ration.4 Second, section 409.1(C) of the 1983 Amendments5 re-
quires, with two important exceptions,' that the affirmative vote of a
supermajority of a corporation's shares approve certain fundamental
corporate transactions with "interested shareholders."17 Last, section
910 of the 1983 Amendments8 creates a right in shareholders to de-
mand that a "controlling person"9 purchase their shares of stock at a
"fair value" plus a control premium."
At least one commentator has called the 1983 Amendments a
"bad management protection enactment." 1 The 1983 Amendments
are statutory codifications of three antitakeover devices commonly
1. Act of December 23, 1983, Pub. L. 395 No. 92, effective immediately, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1408(B), 1409.1(C) and 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
2. Act of May 5, 1933, Pub. L. 364, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1001-
2203 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984-1985). All section numbers of the 1983 Amendments in the
text are those of the BCL.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408(B) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985), governs the fiduciary
duties that management owes the corporation. For a discussion of the section see infra text
accompanying notes 218-28.
5. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1(C) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1(C)(2)(i) and (ii) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
These exceptions are discussed infra at notes 239-47 and accompanying text.
7. An "interested shareholder" is defined in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1(C)(1)
(Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). For a complete discussion of the term see infra text accompanying
notes 237-238.
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
9. "Controlling person" is defined in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(B)(l) (Purdon
Supp. 1984-1985). For a discussion of the term, see infra text accompanying notes 253-58.
10. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(C)-(E) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
1I. See Sell, A Critical Analysis of a New Approach to State Takeover Legislation
After MITE, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 473, 479 (1984).
used in amendments to articles of incorporation.' 2 While the General
Assembly's purpose in amending the BCL arguably is broader, the
1983 Amendments effectively shield incumbent management of
Pennsylvania corporations from displacement in corporate takeovers.
This comment examines two constitutional questions: Does fed-
eral regulation of corporate acquisitions preempt the 1983 Amend-
ments by operation of the Supremacy Clause,' 3 and do the 1983
Amendments violate the Commerce Clause?" The comment con-
cludes that while federal regulation and the Supremacy Clause'5 do
not preempt Pennsylvania's enactment, the 1983 Amendments do vi-
olate the Commerce Clause' 6 because the intended protection of
shareholders is marginal or illusory and the incidental burdens on
commerce are too great.
II. Article Amendment Shark Repellents
Corporate managers faced with unfriendly takeover attempts
have developed an arsenal of defensive techniques. 7 Many of these
techniques involve "shark repellent amendments" to the target cor-
poration's articles of incorporation. 8 For purposes of analyzing the
1983 Amendments to the BCL, only those types of article amend-
ments that seek to make completion of a two-step acquisition 9 more
12. See infra text accompanying notes 17-34.
13. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
17. For an overview of the mechanics and propriety of corporate defensive techniques,
see E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL, 193-206 (1977); E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL, 219-76 (1973)" M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, I TAKEOVERS &
FREEZEOUTS §§ 6.01-.09 (1984); E. Steinberger, Corporate Takeovers - Cash Tender Offers,
Exchange Offers and Target Defense, in I BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS § 18.5 (J. Herz & C.
Bailer eds. 2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1983); Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amend-
ments: Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Gilson, Shark Repellent Amendments]; Black & Smith, Antitakeover Charter
Provisions: Defending Self-Help for Takeover Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699 (1979);
Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers: Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW.
537 (1979).
18. These article amendments are called "shark repellents" because they operate "to
encourage the 'shark' [the acquiring corporation] to seek a more appetizing or more easily
digested alternative." Gilson, Shark Repellent Amendments, supra note 17, at 777.
19. A two-step acquisition is a technique by which a corporation or individual acquires
the entire equity interest in another corporation. It is employed when the acquiror is unable to
negotiate the transaction or lacks the financial ability to wage a successful one-step takeover
bid.
A two-step acquisition, in its simplest form, consists of the acquisition of control of a
corporation by open market purchases of stock or tender offer in the first step and completion
of the acquisition by merger of the target corporation into the acquiror or its subsidiary at a
lower price per share than was paid in the first step. For general discussions of the many
methods of effecting two-step acquisitions see N. Brockmeyer & W. Yerkes, Two-Step Acqui-
sitions - "Freezing Out" Minority Shareholders in I BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS § 19.1 (J. Herz
& C. Bailer eds. 2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1983); Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An
difficult or expensive are relevant.
There are three general types of article amendment barriers to
the completion of a two-step acquisition. First, the articles of incor-
poration may require supermajority shareholder approval of certain
fundamental corporate transactions.2 ° Second, the articles may re-
quire that the minority whose interest is being acquired in the second
step receive a "fair price" for its interest as determined by some
formula.2 Last, the articles may allow minority shareholders to de-
mand that the target corporation purchase their shares at a price
equal to or greater than the price paid for shares in the target in the
first step."
Supermajority shareholder approval requirements usually apply
to mergers and similar fundamental corporate transactions23 with
shareholders of the target who own a substantial block of the target's
stock.24 The percentage of shareholders whose vote is required to ap-
prove the second-step transaction may be fixed25 or floating.2" Nor-
mally, these provisions allow management to exempt a given transac-
tion from the supermajority approval requirement. 7 To be most
effective, the article amendment must be accompanied by a lockup
provision," which requires a supermajority vote to amend or repeal
the supermajority approval requirement.29
Alternative Approach to Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1679 (1979); Se-
curities Exchange Act Release No. 21079 reprinted in 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1119, 1119-22
(1984). For an example of a two-step acquisition, see infra text accompanying notes 393-96.
20. See infra notes 23-29 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
23. For an example of the broad scope of these transactions, see Proxy Statement of
PSA, Inc. (Oct. 23, 1978), reprinted in Gilson, Shark Repellent Amendments, supra note 17,
at 783 n.38. See also DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder
Wealth, II J. FIN. ECON. 329, 331 (1983); Linn & McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of
the Impact of 'Antitakeover' Amendments on Common Stock Prices, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 361,
365-66 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Hochman & Folger, supra note 17, at 548. For an example of an article
amendment containing a supermajority provision, see Amendment to Diamond International
Corp. Charter in PLI, TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 531 (A.
Fleischer, M. Lipton, R. Mundheim & R. Santoni eds. 1981).
25. See, e.g., Smith, Fair Price and Redemption Rights: New Dimensions in Defense
Charter Provisions, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (1978) (reporting percentages required for share-
holder approval ranging from 66-2h% up to 95% with the most common figure being 80%).
26. A floating percentage provision requires that the transaction with the interested
shareholder gain the affirmative vote of a majority of the shares not owned by the interested
shareholder. See Hochman & Folger, supra note 17, at 549. For an example of both fixed and
floating percentage approval requirements, see Amendment to Diamond International Corp.
Charter, reprinted in PLI, TWELFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 531 (A.
Fleischer, M. Lipton, R. Mundheim & R. Santoni eds. 1981).
27. The availability of an exemption provision to the supermajority requirement gives
management influence in negotiations with the acquiror and allows flexibility in internal corpo-
rate reorganizations, for example, in the case of a merger with the target's own subsidiary.
See, Hochman & Folger, supra note 17, at 550-52; Smith, supra note 25, at 6-7.
28. See DeAngelo & Rice, supra note 23, at 331-32; Gilson, Shark Repellent Amend-
ments, supra note 17, at 790; Linn & McConnell, supra note 23, at 367.
29. For an example of a lockup provision requiring the vote of 80% of a corporation's
"Fair price" article amendments build on supermajority ap-
proval requirements. They require supermajority approval for a
merger or other fundamental corporate transaction unless the price
paid to the minority for its interest is "fair" as determined by some
formula.30 There are two variations of fair price formulas that are
relevant to an analysis of the 1983 Amendments. The first requires
the price paid to the minority to be the current market price of the
stock plus the same control premium as was paid for the initial block
of stock.3 1 The second requires that the acquiror pay the minority
the highest price per share that he paid at any time during the first
step.
31
Right of redemption article amendments are a refinement of
supermajority and fair price provisions. 3 Under a right of redemp-
tion provision, the initiative rests with the minority because it may
demand that the target corporation purchase its shares at a price
determined by a formula similar to those in fair price provisions.34
Shark repellent article amendments deter the completion of a
two-step acquisition in two ways. Fair price and right of redemption
provisions relieve pressure on the target's shareholders to sell their
shares in the first step because all shareholders are guaranteed that
they will receive as high a price for their shares in the second step as
in the first.35 All three types of shark repellent amendments make
the second step more difficult because of the burden of mustering the
requisite supermajority or meeting the fair price formula. 3 Addi-
tionally, fair price and right of redemption provisions may remove all
control over the cost of the acquisition from the acquiror's hands.
37
stock to repeal an 80% approval requirement, see Proposed Article X to the Company's Char-
ter Requiring an [80%] Vote With Respect to Certain Business Combinations Unless Certain
Conditions are Met in BUSINESS ACQUISITIONS 390, 397-98 (J. Herz & C. Bailer eds. Supp.
1983) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Article X]; See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1805(B)
(Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
30. See DeAngelo & Rice, supra note 23, at 331; Gilson, Shark Repellent Amend-
ments, supra note 17, at 787; Hochman & Folger, supra note 17, at 553-54; Smith, supra note
25, at 13-17. For examples of fair price article provision see M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, 2
TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS Appendix G, 19-24 (1984); Smith, supra note 25, at 29.
31. See Hochman & Folger, supra note 17, at 554.
32. Id.; Proposed Article X in BUSINESS ACQUISITIONs 390, 397 (J. Herz & C. Bailer
eds. Supp. 1983).
33. See Hochman & Folger, supra note 17, at 555; Smith, supra note 25, at 23. 'See
also Linn & McConnell, supra note 23, at 366. For an example of a right of redemption
provision, see Smith, supra note 25, at 34.
34. See Black & Smith, supra note 17, at 719; Smith, supra note 25, at 23-26.
35. See Hochman & Folger, supra note 17, at 554.
36. Id.
37. See Black & Smith, supra note 17, at 717; Gilson, Shark Repellent Amendments,
supra note 17, at 789.
III. State and Federal Regulation of the Takeover Process
A. The Williams Act
In 1968 the United States Congress enacted the Williams Act3"
to regulate an increasingly popular3 9 corporate takeover device, the
tender offer.40 In the Williams Act, Congress required tender offer-
ors to make "full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors while
at the same time providing the offeror and management equal oppor-
tunity to fairly present their case."
41
The most significant provisions of the Williams Act are its dis-
closure requirements. Any person who acquires direct or indirect
beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a class of certain
registered equity securities must disclose prescribed information.42
The person acquiring more than five percent of the class of stock
must disclose the requisite information to the issuer of the security,
the exchange on which it is traded and the Securities Exchange
Commission. " Likewise, any person who makes a tender offer for
similarly registered securities must file the same information with
the Securities Exchange Commission, 44 the target company 45 and
38. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13(d)-(f), 14 (d)-(f), Act of July 29, 1968,
Pub. L. No. 9-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968), as amended by Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
567, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970), as amended by Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-29 § 10, 89 Stat. 97, 119-21, as amended by Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved
Disclosure Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 202, 91 Stat. 1494, 1498-99 codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(f), 78n(d)-(f), (1982), as amended by Act of June 6, 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-38, § 2(a), 97 Stat. 205, codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78m(e), 78n(g) (West Supp. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as the Williams Act; section numbers are those of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934].
39. See generally H. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811; E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR COR-
PORATE CONTROL, XV (1973).
40. The term "tender offer" is not defined in federal securities regulation. Congress
apparently left the definition of the term open in order to preserve the flexibility of the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission and the courts. See Note, A Failed Experiment: State Takeover
Regulation After Edgar v. MITE Corp., 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 457 n.1 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Note, A Failed Experiment].
One commentator defines a tender offer as "a publicly made invitation addressed to all
shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares for sale at a specified price." Note, The
Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973). See also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOP-
MENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, 1-26 (1977); M. LIPTON & E. STEIN-
BERGER, I TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS § 2.02 (1984); H. Einhorn, What is A "Tender Offer"?
in PLI, TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 245 (A. Fleischer, M. Lipton,
R. Stevenson eds. 1979).
41. H. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813.
42. The acquiror must disclose information regarding his background and identity, the
source and amount of his funds, his contemplated plans to acquire control of the issuing corpo-
ration, the number of shares that he owns and information pertaining to agreements with other
persons in regard to the securities. See § 13 (d)(1) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78m(d)(l) (1982); see also 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1, 240.13d-101 (1984) (detailing filing re-
quirements for Schedule 13D).
43. Section 13(d)(1) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (1982).
44. Id.
competing tender offerors4' "as soon as practicable on the date of the
commencement of the tender offer."47
The Williams Act also grants substantive rights to shareholders
of the target corporation. First, tendering shareholders may with-
draw their tendered shares at any time within seven days or after
sixty days from the date of the original offer.48 Second, the offeror
must purchase the tendered shares pro rata, if the offer is for less
than all shares of a class, and shareholders tender more shares than
the offeror seeks.49 Third, all tendering shareholders are entitled to
receive the same consideration for their shares if the offeror in-
creases the consideration during the period of the offer.5" Last, the
Williams Act proscribes untrue statements or omissions of material
fact and "any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices."'"
B. State Takeover Disclosure Statutes
Following passage of the Williams Act, most states also enacted
legislation to regulate corporate takeover attempts.5 In part, these
statutes were responses to target companies' requests for greater pro-
tection from takeover bidders than the Williams Act provided.53
While the language of takeover disclosure laws varies, they share a
number of common provisions. 4 Pennsylvania's Takeover Disclosure
Law, 55 in many respects, is typical.
Most takeover disclosure laws require the offeror to register the
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3 (1984).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Section 14(d)(5) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5) (1982). The Securi-
ties Exchange Commission has extended the 7-day withdrawal right to 15 business days from
commencement of the offer or 10 business days from the commencement of a competing offer,
if the original offeror has knowledge of the competing offer and has not accepted the shares
that are sought to be withdrawn. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7(a)(1) and (2) (1984).
49. Section 14(d)(6) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (6) (1982). The Wil-
liams Act's proration rights originally applied only to shares tendered in the first 10 days of
the offer. The Securities Exchange Commission has now extended these rights to the entire
period of the offer. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984).
50. Section 14(d)(7) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
51. Section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
52. For a collection of these statutes, see Profusek & Gompf, State Takeover Legisla-
tion After MITE: Standing Pat, Blue Sky, or Corporation Law Concepts?, 7 CORP. L. REV.
3, 5 n.16 (1984). See also M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, 1 TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS §
5.04 (1984) (tabular breakdown of statutes and provisions). This comment refers to these stat-
utes as takeover disclosure laws.
53. Id. at 5; see also Note, A Failed Experiment, supra note 40, at 462. Pennsylvania's
General Assembly has noted that "[it is hereby determined and declared as a matter of legis-
lative finding that legislation is necessary to provide adequate protection for Pennsylvania cor-
porations, shareholders, and employees and the public from the use of takeover offers without
full and fair disclosure of information concerning them." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 73 (Purdon
Supp. 1984-1985).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 56-74.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
tender offer with a state securities commission or an administrative
officer who is responsible for administering state securities regula-
tion. 56 Simultaneously, the offeror must send a copy of its registra-
tion statement to the target company."' Registration normally must
precede commencement of the tender offer by a considerable period
of time.58 The registration statement discloses much of the same in-
formation required by the Williams Act.59 Some state statutes, how-
ever, create disclosure requirements more burdensome than those of
the Williams Act.60
Takeover disclosure laws often empower the officer charged with
administering the law to call hearings pertaining to the tender of-
fer."1 The scope of these hearings may be limited to the adequacy of
the offeror's disclosure,6  or it may permit the officer to evaluate the
tender offer's substantive fairness. 63 Furthermore, many laws permit
either the administrative officer or the target company to invoke the
hearing procedure.6 4 The hearings delay the registration date,
thereby delaying the tender offer itself.6 5
Takeover disclosure laws often provide shareholders with with-
drawal, proration and equal consideration rights66 analogous to those
56. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 30-1503 (1980 & Supp. 1984) (registration must be filed with
the Director of the Department of Finance); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74(a)(i) (Purdon Supp.
1984-1985) (registration must be filed with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission).
57. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit.'70, § 74(a)(ii) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
58. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.212(4) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (registration must
precede commencement by 10 days); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74(a) (Purdon Supp. 1984-
1985) (registration must precede commencement by 20 days).
59. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 75 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
60. Id. Cf. section 13(d)(1) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). The
Pennsylvania statute goes beyond the requirements of the Williams Act, particularly with re-
spect to the offeror's operations, the identity of its officers and its employment practices. The
Pennsylvania Securities Commission may also require the offeror to submit "[s]uch other and
further documents, exhibits, data, and information as may be required by regulation of the
commission. . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 75(9) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
61. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
62. Id.
63. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 804(1)(B) (Supp. 1984-1985). This subsec-
tion allows the Maine Superintendent of Banking to determine in a public hearing whether:
(I) The financial condition of the offeror is such as to jeopardize the interests
of any security holders of the target company;
(2) The terms of the takeover bid are unfair or inequitable to the security hold-
ers of the target company;
(3) The plans and proposals which the offeror has, to make any material
change in the target company's business or corporate or other organiza-
tional structure or management, are not in the interest of the security hold-
ers of the target company; and
(4) The competence, experience and integrity of those persons who would con-
trol the operation of the target company are such that it would not be in
the interest of the security holders of the target company to accept the
takeover bid.
Id.
64. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74(d) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
65. See, e.g., id.
66. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 77(a)-(c) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
provisions in the Williams Act. 7 Finally, takeover disclosure laws
generally allow either the administrative officer or the target com-
pany's management to exempt a tender offer from registration and
disclosure requirements.6 8
Jurisdiction of the takeover disclosure laws is based on the rela-
tionship of the target company to the state. 9 Thus, a statute may
define a target company as one organized under the laws of the
state,7 0 having its principal place of business in the state,71 substan-
tial assets in the state72 or some percentage of shareholders within
the state. 73 Under any of these formulations, takeover disclosure
laws apply to extraterritorial transactions if the target company has
the requisite nexus with the regulating state.7 4
IV. Takeover Disclosure Laws and the Constitution
Potential corporate acquirors responded to state takeover dis-
closure laws with a series of constitutional challenges 75 that began in
67. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. The state provisions often vary the
terms of these rights. See Profusek & Gompf, supra note 52, at 8 n.28.
68. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 78 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).




73. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 121 , § 137..52-9 (repealed 1983) (ten percent of secur-
ity holders located in state or fulfilling two of three conditions as follows: organized under laws
of state, having principal office in state or having ten percent of paid-in surplus and capital in
state). See also E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 39, at 207-08 (listing
seven factors used by states in applying takeover disclosure laws).
74. See Profusek & Gompf, supra note 52, at 7. For discussions of the jurisdiction of
takeover disclosure laws, see Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the
Theoretical Underpinnings of Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 733, 752
(1979); Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects and Political Compe-
tence, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 219 (1977).
75. For decisions holding state takeover disclosure laws unconstitutional, see Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Illinois law); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th
Cir. 1983), affig 547 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1980) (Virginia law); Mesa Petroleum Co. v.
Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983), aff'g [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,064 (W.D. Okla. December 21, 1982) (Oklahoma law); Martin-Marietta
Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982) (Michigan law); National City Lines Inc.
v. LLC Corp. 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982), affig in part, 524 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Mo. 1981)
(Missouri law); Kennecott Corp v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980) on remand 507 F.
Supp. 1206 (D.N.J. 1981) (New Jersey law); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir.
1980) (Illinois law); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), af'g,
439 F.2d 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on venue grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United
Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979) (Idaho law); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Cities Serv. Co.,
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,063 (W.D. Okla. December 20,
1982) (Oklahoma law); Vista Resources v. Connolly [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,627 (D. Mass. March 16, 1982) (Massachusetts law); Natomas Co. v.
Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1982) (Nevada law); Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marietta
Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982) (Maryland law); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
Marley, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) I 98,246 (W.D. Okla. July
17, 1981) (Oklahoma law); E.A. Dev., Inc. v. Amen, No. 210, slip. op. (D. Neb. June 26 &
July 2, 1981) (Nebraska law); Gunter v. AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86 (N.D. Fla. 1981)
(Florida law); Empire Inc. v. Ashcroft, 524 F. Supp. 898 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (Missouri law);
Canadian Pac. (U.S.) Enter., Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (Ohio law);
1977 with the case of Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell.76
Challengers asserted that the Supremacy Clause 77 invalidated state
statutes because they impermissibly conflicted with the purposes of
the Williams Act. 78 The challengers also argued that state takeover
disclosure laws violated the Commerce Clause79 because their pro-
tection of resident target company shareholders was marginal, and
because they unduly burdened commerce.80
A. Preemption and State Takeover Disclosure Laws
The judicial doctrine of federal preemption gives effect to the
Supremacy Clause.8" Under the doctrine, federal enactments super-
sede state law under certain circumstances. 82 In examining preemp-
tion challenges to state takeover disclosure laws, courts have consist-
ently employed the course of inquiry summarized in Jones v. Rath
Packing Co.83 to determine whether a federal enactment preempts a
state statute.
Under the Rath Packing analysis, the court first ascertains
whether the congressional act prohibits state regulation of commerce
Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pennsylvania law); Hi-Shear Indus.,
Inc. v. Neiditz, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,805 (D. Conn. Decem-
ber 16, 1980) (Connecticut law); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, [1981 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,804 (D.S.C. December 4, 1980) (South Carolina law); Brascan
Ltd. v. Lassiter [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,247 (E.D. La.
April 30, 1979) (Louisiana law); Dart Indus. Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. I (S.D. Ind. 1978)
(Delaware law); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982) (Kentucky law); Sharon
Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 121 N.H. 607, 433 A.2d 1250 (1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1101
(1983), reversed, 124 N.H. 1, 466 A.2d 919 (1983) (New Hampshire law); Kelly ex rel.
McLaughlin v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51, 302 N.W.2d 596 (1981) (Michigan law);
contra Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91,875 (D.
Minn. November 15, 1984) (Minnesota law). Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 542 F.
Supp. 231 (D. Mass. 1982) (enjoining Massachusetts law), vacated and remanded, 686 F.2d
1029 (Ist Cir. 1982) (Massachusetts law); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,154 (E.D. Va. September 3, 1979), vacated, 618 F.2d
1029 (4th Cir. 1980) (Virginia law); AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.
Ohio 1979) (Ohio law); Wylain Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Chan. 1980).
76. 439 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on
venue grounds sub nom., Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
77. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
78. See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980); Great Western, 577
F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981). But see
Agency Rent-A-Car v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029(lst Cir. 1982) (courts should seek to recon-
cile operation of Williams Act and state law; Massachusetts law not preempted); AMCA Int'l
Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (compliance with both Williams Act and
Ohio law possible; Ohio law does not frustrate investor protection purpose of Williams Act;
Ohio law not preempted).
79. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
80. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (Illinois law's burdens on
commerce outweigh state interests); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425
(10th Cir. 1983) (Oklahoma law's burdens on commerce outweigh state interests).
81. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. 420, 434 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
82. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
343-57 (10th ed. 1980); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-23 to 6-26 (1978).
83. 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
in the area addressed by the act. 4 This prohibition may be explicit
in the federal statute's language or implicit in its structure and pur-
pose.8 5 State regulation that Congress has not expressly prohibited is
nonetheless preempted if it conflicts with the federal statute.8 6 To
ascertain the existence of conflict, courts employ the Hines test: 7
'[The court must] determine whether, under the circumstances of
this particular case, [the state's] law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."881 Finally, in pursuing its inquiry, the court must "con-
sider the relationship between state and federal laws as they are in-
terpreted and applied, not merely as they are written."8 9
Congress did not expressly prohibit state regulation of tender
offers when it passed the Williams Act because it left the Savings
Clause90 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 intact at that
time.91 "The section was plainly intended to protect, rather than to
limit state authority."92 The federal scheme of tender offer regula-
tion is neither so pervasive,93 nor of such paramount importance that
it preempts concurrent state regulation." Thus, state takeover dis-
closure laws fall to preemption if they facially conflict9 5 with federal
regulation or if they frustrate Congress' "full purpose and objec-
tives""6 in enacting the federal scheme. 97 To apply the Hines test, a
84. Id. at 525 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
142 (1963)).
85. Id. at 525 (citing City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624
(1973); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
86. 430 U.S. at 525-26.
87. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
88. Id. at 67.
89. 430 U.S. at 526.
90. Section 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982)
provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission
(or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over any secur-
ity or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter
or the rules and regulations thereunder.
91. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 n.6 (1982) (White, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1275 n.39
(noting that the Savings Clause predated the Williams Act, which in turn predated all but one
takeover disclosure law).
92. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. at 182.
93. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 1980). Cf. Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith,Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 137 (1973) (state law may void a con-
tractual provision allowing forfeiture of account executive's pension rights despite Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 provision requiring arbitration because federal provision does not go to
the investor protection purpose of the Exchange Act).
94. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (national security is of paramount
importance; thus, federal enactments preempt state sedition laws); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941) (alien registration is of paramount importance; thus, federal regulation
preempts state alien registration act).
95. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. at 142.
96. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. at 67.
97. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 637 (1982) (White, J., joined by
Blackmun, J., and Burger, C.J.).
court must first determine Congress' purpose in passing the Williams
Act.
The principal purpose of the Williams Act is to protect inves-
tors.9 8 In order to protect investors, Congress adopted a disclosure99
or "market approach." 100 One court has noted that "[tihe function
of [the Williams Act] is to get information to the investor by al-
lowing both the offeror and the incumbent managers of a target
company to present fully their arguments and let the investor decide
for himself."'' 1
Courts interpreting the Williams Act and its legislative history
have found that Congress intended to preserve a neutral balance be-
tween incumbent management and takeover bidders. 102 Favoring in-
cumbent management would allow it to delay a tender offer. 0 3 De-
lay, in turn, could sap the vigor of the tender offer mechanism and
deprive shareholders of the opportunity to tender their shares at a
premium.10
4
State takeover disclosure laws conflict with both the investor
protection and neutrality policies of the Williams Act. Because Con-
gress chose to protect investors by requiring disclosure,0 5 state stat-
utes that substituted the judgment of administrators for that of in-
vestors conflicted with the Williams Act.06 Likewise, state disclosure
requirements that were more extensive than those of the Williams
98. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982); Piper v. Chris Craft
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49, 58
(1975); see also H. R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2813-14.
99. Piper, 430 U.S. at 26; Rondeau, 422 U.S. at 58.
100. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1276.
101. Id. See also H. R. REP. No. 1711, supra note 98, at 2813.
102. Compare Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977) (the Court
noted that neutrality is only a characteristic of the Williams Act's sole purpose of investor
protection, in determining that section 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982),
did not create an implied right of action in an unsuccessful takeover bidder against the suc-
cessful bidder.) with MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1980) (court held that
neutrality and investor purposes are intertwined and indistinguishable). See also 113 CONG.
REc. 854-55 (1967) (Senator Harrison A. Williams explaining that he drafted the Williams
Act to preserve neutrality so that investors would have the benefit of tender offers at a pre-
mium over the market price of shares); 113 CONG. REC. 24665-66 (1967) (Senators Jacob K.
Javitz and Harrison A. Williams commenting on the importance of allowing tender offers to
proceed and that the Williams Act might encourage tender offers by requiring disclosure of
enough information for investors to make an intelligent choice).
103. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 495 (7th Cir. 1980); Empire, Inc.v. Ash-
croft, 524 F. Supp. 898, 904 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
104. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1980); Dart Indus. Inc. v.
Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 10 (S.D. Ind. 1978).
105. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
106. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1279 (5th Cir. 1978); see
also Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 98,246 at 91,620 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981); Hi-Shear Indus. v. Campbell
[1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,804 at 90,031 (D.S.C. December 4,
1980); Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
98,247 at 91,625 (E.D. La. April 30, 1979).
Act conflicted with federal law"°7 because the additional information
might confuse investors.10 8 Takeover disclosure laws also conflicted
with the neutrality policy of the Williams Act by allowing delay.
Thus, the waiting period between the filing of an offer with the state
administrator and the permissible commencement date favored the
target's management.' 0 9 Similarly, the state hearing requirements
permitted delay, which favored the target's management, 10 particu-
larly when target management could invoke the hearing process."'
After the Securities Exchange Commission promulgated Rule
14D-2(b)," 2 actual facial conflict between state laws and the Wil-
liams Act became possible.1 3 Rule 14D-2(b) requires commence-
ment or withdrawal of a tender offer within five days of its public
announcement." 4 Takeover disclosure laws require the offeror to file
a registration statement ten to twenty days before registration actu-
ally takes place.1 5 Registration must proceed the tender offer's com-
mencement. 1 6 Since the state registration statement is public notice
of the offer under Rule 14D-2," 7 compliance with both the federal
five-day requirement and the state waiting period is impossible." 8
107. See, e.g., Great Western, 439 F. Supp. at 436. But see AMCA Int'l Corp. v.
Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 936-38 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Ohio law providing for precommence-
ment notification, greater disclosure and hearings on substantive fairness did not conflict with
the Williams Act).
108. See, e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1131 (8th Cir.
1982); Great W. United Corp v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th Cir. 1978); Dart Indus.,
Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 13 (S.D. Ind. 1978); cf. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976) (too much disclosure in the context of proxy solicitations); Gunter v.
AGO Int'l B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86, 90 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (insurance regulation).
109. See Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 1980); MITE Corp. v.
Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 495 (7th Cir. 1980); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256,
1278 (5th Cir. 1978).
110. See, e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1131 (8th Cir.
1982); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494 (7th Cir. 1980); Great W. United Corp. v.
Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978).
!11. See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 494-95 (1980); Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (1978).
112. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984).
113. When the Securities Exchange Commission adopted the rule, it was fully aware of
this effect. It published a release that explained the conflict, stating: -[T]he conflict between
Rule 14d-2(b) and such state [takeover disclosure] statutes is so direct and substantial as to
make it impossible to comply with both sets of requirements as they presently exist." Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 16384 reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,373 at 82,584 (November 29, 1979).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984).
115. See statutes cited supra note 58.
116. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 74 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
117. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16384, reprinted in [1979-1980 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373 at 82,583-84 (November 29, 1979).
118. See, e.g., National City Lines v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1130 (8th Cir. 1982);
Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 1980); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp.
782, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Canadian Pac. Enter. (U.S.), Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192,
1204 (S.D. Ohio 1981). See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16384 reprinted in
[1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,373 at 82,583-84 (November 29,
1979).
Under the Supremacy Clause 9 the federal rule preempts the state
law.
1 20
The Supreme Court of the United States reached the issue of
whether the Williams Act preempts state takeover disclosure laws
for the first time121 in Edgar v. MITE Corp.12 2 In that case, MITE,
a Delaware corporation, made a tender offer for all shares of Chi-
cago Rivet & Machine Co., an Illinois corporation. MITE made the
requisite federal disclosure, but did not comply with the Illinois Bus-
iness Takeover Act, 23 which was clearly applicable to the offer.1
24
Instead, MITE filed an action in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief on the grounds that the Williams Act preempted the Illinois
law and that the Illinois law violated the Commerce Clause. When
the Illinois Secretary of State and Chicago Rivet announced their
intention to invoke the Illinois law, the district court preliminarily
enjoined its enforcement against MITE Corp. After MITE made its
offer, worth $23 million at the offering price, the district court per-
manently enjoined enforcement of the Illinois law against MITE, de-
claring that it was preempted by the Williams Act and that it vio-
lated the Commerce Clause.1 2  The Illinois Secretary of State
appealed.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court.126 It held that the Illinois law was preempted be-
cause its hearing provisions allowed both the substitution of the Illi-
nois Secretary of State's judgment for that of investors 27 and undue
delay of the tender offer. Further, the Illinois law allowed manage-
ment to invoke the hearing process .'2 8 The Illinois law was also pre-
empted because its twenty day waiting period caused delay129 and
because Congress had rejected similar provision.' Finally, the Illi-
119. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
120. See cases cited supra note 118. See also infra note 297.
121. In Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979), rev'g, Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), the court reversed the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on venue grounds and did not reach the merits.
122. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
123. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1h, §§ 137.51-137.70 (repealed 1983).
124. The Illinois Act applied to offers for target corporations ten percent of whose secur-
ities subject to the offer were owned by Illinois residents or offers for target corporations meet-
ing two of the three following conditions: (1) the target corporation had its principal place of
business in Illinois; (2) the target corporation had its principal executive offices in Illinois or;
(3) the target corporation had ten percent of its stated capital and paid-in surplus in Illinois.
Twenty-seven percent of Chicago Rivet's shareholders lived in Illinois, it was an Illinois corpo-
ration and it had its executive offices in that state.
125. The district court opinion was unreported.
126. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
127. Id. at 494.
128. Id. at 495.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 497.
nois law violated the Commerce Clause.13 1
Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court in Edgar v. MITE
Corp.3 2 While the Court invalidated the Illinois law because it vio-
lated the Commerce Clause, only Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Blackmun joined Justice White in holding that it was preempted.
Justice White found that "a major aspect of the effort to protect the
investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover
bidder ' 13 3 thus, Congress "expressly embraced a policy of neutral-
ity"'134 when it passed the Williams Act. He noted that the Illinois
law conflicted with Congress' neutrality policy because the delay at-
tending the law's twenty day waiting period favored the target's
management. 135 Similarly, the Illinois hearing requirements, which
either the Illinois Secretary of State or target management13 1 could
invoke, introduced further delay and target management advantage
into the tender offer process.' 37 Finally, the Illinois law was pre-
empted because it allowed the Illinois Secretary of State to evaluate
the substantive fairness of the offer and thus conflicted with Con-
gress' policy of investor free choice. 138 Justice White did not address
the issue of facial conflict between the Illinois law and Rule 14D-
2(b)' 39 because the original litigation in the case took place prior to
the rule's promulgation."10
Justice Stevens would have held the case moot;' however, he
did reach the merits. He acknowledged the neutrality policy of the
Williams Act but observed: "I am not persuaded . . . that Congress'
decision to follow a policy of neutrality in its own legislation is tanta-
mount to a federal prohibition against state legislation designed to
provide special protection for incumbent management."'4 2 Justice
Powell agreed, holding that Congress' policy of neutrality implied no
intent to prohibit state laws which "assure[d] - at least in circum-
stances - greater protection to interests that include but often are
131. Id. at 502.
132. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
133. Id. at 633.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 635. The court found that the 20-day period between filing of the registration
and the registration itself favored target management because the offeror could not communi-
cate its offer to shareholders during that time, while the target's management was free to do so
during that period.
136. Id. at 637. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , § 137.57 (A) and (B) (repealed 1983).
That statute allowed Illinois residents holding ten percent of the shares that were the subject
of the offer to invoke the hearing. Id.
137. 457 U.S. at 637.
138. Id. at 639.
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984).
140. 457 U.S. at 636 n.1 1.
141. Id. at 647 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
142. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
broader than those of incumbent management.""" Justice O'Connor
did not reach the preemption issue.1 44 Justices Marshall, Brennan"
and Rehnquist 48 dissented, holding that the case was moot.
Because Justice White failed to persuade a majority to join his
preemption holding1 47 and because of the observations of Justices
Stevens and Powell,148 the vitality of preemption as an avenue of
attack on state securities regulation may have abated since Edgar v.
MITE Corp.141 In Agency Rent-A-Car v. Connolly,'" the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit addressed the narrow issue of whether
an order of the Massachusetts Securities Division that prohibited a
tender offeror from acquiring further shares in the target company
for one year conflicted with the neutrality policy of the Williams
Act. The court of appeals held that it did not conflict with the neu-
trality policy of the William Act. The court vacated the district
court's preliminary injunction of the Massachusetts law and re-
manded the case to the district court for determination of the Com-
merce Clause issue, which the district court had not reached.' 5'
The First Circuit held that courts should attempt to reconcile
the operation of state and federal laws 5" and should afford the states
leeway in their choice of remedies, despite some conflict with a fed-
eral statutory scheme. 15 3 The court also noted, however, that the ac-
quiror might develop a factual record on remand to show that Mas-
sachusetts' law halted too many tender offers and thus conflicted
with the Williams Act. 154 This proposition could be difficult to prove,
since a challenger would have to show that many specific offers had
never been made.' 55 Further, specific proof of the law's deterrent ef-
143. Id. at 646-47 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
144. Id. at 655 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
145. Id. at 664 (Marshall, J., and Brennan, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 667 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
147. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
149. Since MITE, most cases invalidating state takeover disclosure laws have relied on
the Commerce Clause alone. See Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Mesa
Petroleum Corp. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983); Martin-Marietta Corp.
v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); Sharon Steel Corp v. Whaland, 121 N.H. 1,
466 A.2d 919 (1983). But see National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th
Cir. 1982) (relying on preemption alone, citing MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir.
1980)); Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982) (relying on
preemption and the Commerce Clause); Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1982)
(relying on preemption and the Commerce Clause).
150. 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
151. Id. at 1039-40.
152. Id. at 1038 (citing Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117,
127 (1973) (state law voiding a contractual provision allowing forfeiture of account executives
pension rights despite Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provision requiring arbitration).
153. Id. at 1038 (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (uphold-
ing state injunctive remedy pursuant to state trade secret law despite arguable conflict with
federal patent law policy of disclosure of discoveries for the public good)).
154. Id. at 1039 n.12.
155. Cf. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1284 (5th Cir. 1977) (not-
fect is more probative of an undue burden on commerce.15
B. The Commerce Clause and State Takeover Disclosure Laws
When a state takeover disclosure law is challenged on Com-
merce Clause1 57 grounds, courts consistently apply the balancing test
set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.:1
58
Where the [state] statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. . . . If a legitimate local purpose is
found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.15
Further, when considering a challenged statute, courts are not bound
by the characterization given to it by the legislature; they determine
for themselves the law's practical impact.
1 60
The primary local interest which states have advanced when de-
fending takeover disclosure laws is investor protection. 161 Courts
have accepted this as a legitimate state interest but only to the ex-
tent that the state regulation protects local investors; states have no
legitimate interest in protecting nonresident investors.'62 Moreover,
state regulation that permits the exemption of certain tender offers
l6 3
weakens the argument that the law protects investors.6
The second asserted state interest is that of regulating the inter-
ing that mere speculative evidence of takeover disclosure law's general burden on commerce
does not make out a substantial burden).
156. See infra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
157. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
158. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). For cases applying the Pike test see, e.g., Telvest v. Brad-
shaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Mesa Petroleum Corp. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425
(10th Cir. 1983); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982);
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell (5th
Cir. 1978), affig, 439 F.2d 420 (N.D. Tex. 1977), rev'd on venue grounds sub nom., Leroy v.
Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. I (S.D.
Ind. 1978).
159. 397 U.S. at 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443
(1960)).
160. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
161. See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 500 (7th Cir. 1980); Great W.
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1283 (5th Cir. 1980). See also cases cited supra note
158.
162. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1283.
163. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 78 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
164. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982); Martin-Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 566 (6th Cir. 1983). Cf. Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice,
434 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1978) (exceptions in state regulatory ban on double trailers weakened
safety purpose of statute).
nal affairs of local corporations.""6 States have argued that tender
offers are equivalent to fundamental corporate transactions such as
proxy contests, mergers and the sale of assets, all of which are tradi-
tional subjects of state regulation."' 6 In these transactions, corpora-
tion laws protect shareholders by defining their rights as sharehold-
ers and their relationships to management and other shareholders.11
7
Accordingly, because neither Congress, nor the courts have federal-
ized corporation law,'6 8 courts should accord great deference to a
state's interest in regulating the internal affairs of state-created cor-
porations. Also, states have argued that this interest and the eco-
nomic burden that its protection imposes on commerce are noncom-
parable; accordingly, balancing is inappropriate.'
The jurisdictional basis of the statute at issue may affect the
weight that is given to the state's interest in regulating the internal
affairs of a local corporation. 7 Thus, a statute applicable only to
target companies that are incorporated in the regulating state most
clearly implicates that state's internal affairs interest.' 7' A statute
applicable to a target that has its principal place of business or sub-
stantial assets in the regulating state' 7' less clearly implicates this
interest. 73 Courts have not drawn this distinction and have held that
any of these jurisdictional bases allows a takeover disclosure law to
unduly burden commerce because the statute regulates the disposi-
tion of securities by nonresident shareholders.7
165. See, e.g., Mesa Petroleum Corp v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d at 1430; MITE Corp.
v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 501; Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1280 n.53; Crane
Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. at 789; AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. at 939 (S.D.
Ohio 1979).
166. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1280 n.53. Commentators
have also debated whether tender offers are equivalent to fundamental corporate transactions.
For discussions supporting and rebutting the proposition, compare Boehm, supra note 74;
Profusek & Gompf, supra note 52; Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation:
State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIo ST. L.J. 689 (1981), Shipman, Some
Thoughts About the Role of State Takeover Legislation: The Ohio Takeover Act, 21 CASE
WEs. RES. L. REV. 722 (1970) with Langevoort, supra note 74, at 219; Note, Commerce
Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133 (1974);
Note, A Failed Experiment, supra note 40.
167. See Sargent, supra note 166, at 724.
168. See, e.g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (directors' power to terminate
a shareholder's derivative suit governed by state law); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,
479 (1977) (fiduciary duties of directors and shareholders' remedies in statutory short form
merger governed by state, not federal law); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (shareholders'
remedy for illegal political contributions lies in state ultra vires and fiduciary duty law).
169. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1280 n.53. See also Boehm,
supra note 74, at 753. Cf. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Co. Comm'n, Is Or. App. 618,
630, 517 P.2d 691, 697 (1973) (benefit of environmental blight which is cured by container
deposit bill not divisible by economic units).
170. See Boehm, supra note 74, at 752.
171. Id.
172. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 73 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985) (definition of "target
company").
173. See Boehm, supra note 74, at 752.
174. See Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1983) (takeover disclosure
Finally, states have asserted their interest in keeping a corpora-
tion's headquarters in the regulating state. 175 This allegedly pre-
serves the benefits of corporate charitable contributions, environmen-
tal responsibility and civic involvement by talented managers, all of
which might cease if the center of corporate fiscal and community
decisions were to emigrate. 176 Courts have accepted this as a legiti-
mate state interest even though local management gains an advan-
tage from state takeover disclosure laws that serve the interest.
177
This interest rests, however, on the arguable assumption that local
managers are socially responsible, and that their successors under
the regime of a takeover bidder would not be similarly responsible.
1 78
Furthermore, less restrictive alternative means, such as tax incen-
tives for charitable contributions, environmental legislation and civic
involvement programs, better serve this interest. 79
Although regulation aimed at retaining the benefit of benevolent
local management protects a legitimate state interest, regulation to
prevent the migration of local business to other states does not. 8 '
While this legislative purpose does not run afoul of the rule that leg-
islation requiring business operations to be performed in the home
state is unconstitutional, it is nonetheless unacceptable. 8' State
takeover disclosure laws do not require that the target corporation
remain in the regulating states; however, they do hinder
emigration.' 82
The principal burden that state takeover disclosure laws impose
on commerce is the outright halting of tender offers. 183 The typical
state statute empowers its administrator to issue a cease-and-desist
order to the takeover bidder, thereby stopping the tender offer."8
Other burdens on commerce include disruption of national securities
markets, 8" lower initial offers in anticipation of opposition by target
management, 86 general discouragement of tender offers,1 87 depriving
law which applied only to locally incorporated target companies held nonetheless to unduly
burden commerce); but see AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929, 939 (S.D. Ohio
1979) (takeover disclosure law does not unduly burden commerce despite global applicability).
175. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1282-83; Crane Co. v. Lam,
509 F. Supp. at 789; Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. at 11-12.
176. See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1282-83.
177. See id.; Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. at 789.
178. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1286.
179. Id. See also Note, A Failed Experiment, supra note 40, at 467.
180. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1282.
181. Id. See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. at 142 (requiring that canta-
loupes be packed in state to preserve local growers' reputation).
182. Id.
183. See cases cited supra note 158.
184. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 81(1) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
185. See MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 502; Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F.
Supp. at 9; Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. at 439.
186. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439 F. Supp. at 439.
187. See Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d at 580; Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 439
target shareholders of a premium for their shares,1"' prevention of
the allocation of resources to their highest economic use189 and re-
duction of management's incentive to perform efficiently. 190 Courts
have concluded that these burdens outweigh state interests that take-
over disclosure laws seek to protect1 91 because the laws' protections
extend beyond state interests and are only marginal or illusory. 92
In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,9 ' the Court held that the Illinois
Business Takeover Act 94 failed the Pike balancing test. The Illinois
law unduly burdened commerce by its global reach and its potential
to entirely block a tender offer. 193 Furthermore, the court found that
the Illinois law deprived shareholders of the opportunity to sell their
shares at a premium, hindered reallocation of economic resources to
their highest valued use, and removed the "incentive effect" of
tender offers on target management of encouraging management to
perform well. 9 '
The Court balanced these burdens against Illinois' interest in
protecting resident shareholders' 9 7 and its interest in regulating the
internal affairs of Illinois corporations.' 98 Justice White, writing for
the majority, stated: "[Tihe state has no legitimate interest in pro-
tecting nonresident shareholders. Insofar as the Illinois law burdens
out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed in the bal-
ance to sustain the law."1 9 He added that a provision exempting the
target's own competing offer2"' weakened the asserted shareholder-
protection interest. Justice White concluded that the Illinois law's
protection of shareholders was illusory because its provisions dupli-
cated those of the Williams Act2"' and because the risk of a tender
offer's succumbing to the law's dilatory mechanisms outweighed any
F. Supp. at 439.
188. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643.
189. Id.; Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d at 580.
190. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643; Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d at 580.
191. See cases cited supra note 158.
192. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 644-45.
193. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
194. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 , §§ 137.51-137.70 (repealed 1983).
195. 457 U.S. at 643.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 644. The Court noted that protecting resident shareholders was "plainly a
legitimate state objective." id.
198. Id. at 645.
199. Id. at 644.
200. The Illinois law allowed the target to make a competing tender offer for its own
shares without complying with the registration requirements. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 /2, §
137.52-9(4) (repealed 1983). Justice White noted that this exemption left shareholders to de-
pend on the protections of the Williams Act, which Illinois otherwise deemed inadequate. 457
U.S. at 644.
201. 457 U.S. at 644-45. The Illinois law required disclosure by the offeror, a minimum
offering time, withdrawal rights, proration rights and equal consideration rights. See ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 121 /, §§ 137.59(C)-(E) (repealed 1983).
shareholder benefit flowing from those provisions.2"2 Justice White
dismissed Illinois' internal affairs argument: "[The internal affairs]
doctrine is of little use to the State in this context. Tender offers
contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders to a third party and
do not themselves implicate the internal affairs of the target
company."2 °
In a portion of his Commerce Clause analysis that only Chief
Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor joined, Jus-
tice White held that the Illinois law was unconstitutional because it
directly burdened commerce.2"4 He distinguished the Illinois law in
issue from traditional blue-sky laws, z°5 observing that those laws ap-
ply only to dispositions of securities within a state, while the law at
bar had a global effect on securities disposition.20 6 Justice White
based his "direct burden" holding on the use of the mails and other
interstate facilities to communicate and close tender offers.207 Fi-
nally, he noted the potential for conflict among similar state laws at
variance with one another.2 08
Thus, after the decision of Edgar v. MITE Corp., only a Com-
merce Clause attack on state securities regulation bears the impri-
matur of a majority of the Court. 0 ' A preemption attack will suc-
ceed only when the state regulation directly conflicts with federal
regulation either facially, 210 or with the investor protection policy of
the Williams Act.2tt
V. Pennsylvania's New Approach: The 1983 Amendments to the
Business Corporation Law
After the decision of Edgar v. MITE Corp.,2" 2 states sought
ways to regulate corporate takeovers that could withstand constitu-
202. 457 U.S. at 645.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 643.
205. Blue sky laws are state statutes regulating the registration of securities for sale
within a state, the registration of brokers in securities and investment advisers and fraudulent
practices in securities transactions within the state. For an example, see the Pennsylvania Se-
curities Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 1-101 to 1-704 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
206. 457 U.S. at 641. See also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell
v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242
U.S. 568 (1917) (upholding the validity of blue sky laws against Commerce Clause attack).
207. 457 U.S. at 641-42.
208. 457 U.S. at 642-43.
209. The opinion of the Court in MITE consisted of Parts 1, 11, V-B which were the
facts of the case, a holding that the case was not moot, and Justice White's Commerce Clause
analysis under the Pike balancing test.
210. See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
211. The congressional policy of investor protection is still good law, see supra notes 98-
101 and accompanying text, and would defeat a law clearly frustrating this policy based on the
Hines test. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.
212. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
tional attack.213 The 1983 Amendments to Pennsylvania's BCL are a
new approach 214 to regulating tender offers2 15 and two-step acquisi-
tions.21 They codify supermajority, fair price and right of redemp-
tion shark repellent article amendments. 7 Additionally, the 1983
Amendments contain provisions analogous to those of "social con-
science" article amendments." 8
A. Section 408:11 The Corporate Social Conscience
The first new provision in the 1983 Amendments is section
408(B) of the BCL.220 Section 408 sets forth the fiduciary duties of
corporate officers and directors.22 The added subsection permits of-
ficers and directors "in considering the best interests of the corpora-
tion [to] consider the effects of any action upon employes, suppliers
and customers of the corporation, communities in which offices or
other establishments of the corporation are located and all other per-
tinent factors. 222
This language closely resembles that of social conscience article
amendments. 23 These article provisions allow management broader
discretion in exercising its fiduciary duties224 and help to shield di-
rectors and officers from liability for corporate waste.225 Further-
213. In MITE, Justices Powell and Stevens expressed their belief that states have some
room to regulate tender offers. See id. at 646, 654-55. States have developed three post-MITE
legislative approaches. These are commonly called the Ohio approach, the Maryland approach
and the Pennsylvania approach. See generally Special Report, 16 SEc. REG. L. REP. 1392,
1394-95 (1984) (ABA Committee on State Regulation of Securities panel discussion of the
three approaches).
The Ohio approach requires prior shareholder approval of "any control share acquisition."
1982 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-397 (Baldwin) (to be codified at OHIO REv. CODE AN.. § 1701.831).
"Control share acquisition" is defined by the statute as: "One-fifth or more but less than one-
third of such voting power." See 1982 Ohio Legis Serv. 5-395 (Baldwin) (to be codified at
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701(Z)(1)).
The Maryland approach requires 80% fixed-percentage and floating-percentage
supermajority approval of a "business combination" unless fair price and other conditions are
met. See MD. CORPs. & Ass'Ns. CODE § 3-603 (Supp. 1983). For the definition of "business
combination," see MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS. CODE § 3-601(e) (Supp. 1983).
This comment focuses on Pennsylvania's approach alone.
214. See Sell, supra note 11, at 479.
215. For the definition of a tender offer, see supra note 39.
216. For an explanation of the two-step acquisition, see supra note 19.
217. See supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
218. See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
219. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1408 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
220. Id. § 1408(B).
221. "Officers and directors shall be deemed to stand in a fiduciary relation to the corpo-
ration, and shall discharge the duties of their respective positions in good faith and with that
diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar circum-
stances." Id. § 1408(A).
222. Id. § 1408(B).
223. See, e.g., Proxy Statement of Control Data Corp. (March 20, 1978), reprinted in
Black & Smith, supra note 17 at 719 n.69 (proposing a social conscience amendment to that
corporation's articles of incorporation).
224. Black & Smith, supra note 17, at 719.
225. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tac-
more, some courts have approved of management's consideration of
nonshareholder constituencies in the exercise of fiduciary duties.22
This approval was not lost on Pennsylvania's legislators. 27 Professor
Sell asserts that section 408(B) is not conceptually unique.228 He
adds, however, that its inclusion in the 1983 Amendments reflects a
legislative policy that approves of management opposition to any
tender offer, if management believes that the offer is not "in the best
interests of the corporation." '229
B. Section 409.1:230 Supermajority and Fair Price Provisions
The second new provision in the 1983 Amendments is subsec-
tion 409.1(C)131 of the BCL. Previously, section 409.1 governed
transactions between a corporation and its own directors.2 3  The
1983 Amendments expand the scope of the section to include funda-
mental corporate transactions between a corporation or its subsidiary
and shareholders of the corporation.23" The new subsection requires
supermajority approval consisting of "the affirmative vote of the
shareholders entitled to cast at least a majority of the votes which all
shareholders other than the interested shareholder are entitled to
cast with respect to the transaction, without counting the vote of the
interested shareholder. 234
The new subsection governs mergers with a shareholder, 235 sale,
lease or exchange of all or substantially all assets between a corpora-
tion and a shareholder236  and dissolution. 237 "Interested share-
holder[s]" are defined as follows: (1) shareholders who are parties to
tics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 863 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Gilson, A Struc-
tural Approach].
226. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
227. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1983 SENATE LEGIS. J. 1434 (statements of
Senator Michael D. Fisher, the 1983 Amendments' primary sponsor).
228. See Sell, supra note I1, at 480.
229. Id.
230. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
231. Id. § 1409.1(C).
232. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon 1967). The caption of the old section was
"Interested directors; quorum."
233. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). The caption of the
new section is "Interested directors and shareholders' quorum."
234. Id. § 1409.1(C). This supermajority approval formula is analogous to the floating
percentage supermajority provisions in article amendments. For an explanation of a floating
percentage supermajority provision and citation to an example, see supra note 26.
235. Article IX of the BCL, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1901-1910 (Purdon 1967 &
Supp. 1984-1985), governs mergers generally.
236. Section 311(B) of the BCL, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1311(B) (Purdon 1967),
governs voluntary transfers of corporate assets not made in the usual and regular course of
business.
237. Article XI of the BCL, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2101-2112 (Purdon 1967 &
Supp. 1984-1985), governs the dissolution and winding up of corporations. Professor Sell
points out some interesting ambiguities that arise from the interplay between article XI and §
409.1(C). See Sell, supra note 11, at 481. That discussion is beyond the scope of this
comment.
the transaction or who are treated differently than other sharehold-
ers; (2) any person acting jointly with such a shareholder, and; (3)
any person who controls, is controlled by or is under common control
with such a shareholder.238 Unless their principals are interested
shareholders, agents, bankers, brokers, nominees or trustees who act
in good faith and without intending to circumvent this provision are
not interested shareholders. 3 9
Subsection 409.1(C) contains two exceptions to the
supermajority approval requirement. Supermajority approval is not
required if certain directors approve the transaction 24 0 or if the
shareholders receive consideration as high as that given by the inter-
ested shareholder to acquire any shares of the same class.241
Finally, the new subsection imposes the supermajority approval
requirement in addition to "any other approval required by [the
BCL], the articles of incorporation, the bylaws of the corporation or
otherwise. ' 242 Thus, if a corporation's articles or bylaws require a
higher percentage vote of shares than the new subsection, the article
or bylaw provisions govern. For example, a corporation's articles
might require a ninety-five percent shareholder approval for a
merger.243 Section 409.1(C) would require an interested shareholder
owning twenty percent of a corporation's shares to gain a majority
approval of the remaining eighty percent of shares,244 that is forty
percent plus the vote of one share, in order to merge with the corpo-
ration. Thus, the percentage required for approval, totals sixty-five
percent of the shares plus one. Under section 409.1(C)(3), the
ninety-five percent vote required by the corporation's articles would
control the merger.
The new subsection resembles a fair price article amendment. 4"
Like fair price article provisions, section 409.1 (C) deters the comple-
tion of a total corporate acquisition in a two-step transaction in two
238. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1(C)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
239. Id.
240. Supermajority shareholder approval is not required if it
has been approved by a majority vote of the board of directors without counting
the vote of directors who (a) are directors or officers of, or have a material eq-
uity interest in, the interested shareholder or (b) were nominated for election as
a director by the interested shareholder, and first elected as a director, within
twenty-four months of the date of the vote on the proposed transaction.
Id. § 1409.1(C)(2)(i). This is a floating-percentage supermajority director approval provision
to waive the floating-percentage supermajority shareholder approval requirement.
241. Id. § 1409.1(C)(2)(ii). This requirement is analogous to fair price provisions in
article amendments. For a discussion of fair price article amendments, see supra notes 30-32
and accompanying text.
242. Id. § 1409.1(C)(3).
243. See Smith, supra note 25, at 6.
244. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1(C) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
245. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
ways.2" 6 First, it reduces pressure on shareholders to tender their
shares initially, because they are guaranteed as high a price in the
second step as they would have received in the first. 47 Second, it
deters the interested shareholder from ever attempting a second step
merger, sale of assets or dissolution because completion of the acqui-
sition becomes too expensive by operation of the fair price
mechanism .248
C. Section 910:249 The Right of Redemption Provision
The last new provision in the 1983 Amendments is section
910.250 This section gives shareholders the right to demand that a
"controlling person '251 purchase their shares at a "fair value" '252 plus
a control premium.
253
Under section 910 a "controlling person" is a person or group
having the right to vote at least thirty percent of the shares entitled
to be voted in elections of directors.254 The section's thirty percent
trigger does not apply to the following: (1) persons who would be
controlling shareholders, but whose holdings antedate enactment of
the section, if they do not increase the percentage of their hold-
ings; 25 5 (2) agents, banks, brokers, nominees or trustees whose prin-
cipals individually, or if acting in concert, as a group, do not control
the vote of thirty percent of the shares;256 (3) persons who inadver-
tently become controlling persons, provided that they divest them-
selves of enough shares to fall below the thirty percent trigger,257
and; (4) corporations that are subsidiaries of other corporations at
the time of the section's enactment. 258 After acquiring voting control
246. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
249. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
250. Id.
251. See infra notes 254-61 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 261-67 and accompanying text.
253. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(D)-(E) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
254. Id. § 1910(B)(1).
255. Id. § 1910(B)(2).
256. Id. § 1910(B)(3)(i).
257. Id. § 1910(G).
258. Id. § 1910(G). This subsection defines a subsidiary as:
[Any corporation as to which any other corporation has or has the right to
acquire . . . voting power over voting shares of the subsidiary that would entitle
the holders thereof to cast in excess of fifty percent of the votes that all share-
holders would be entitled to cast in the election of directors of such subsidiary:
Provided, however, That a subsidiary will not be deemed to cease being a subsid-
iary so long as such corporation remains a controlling person or group within the
meaning of subsection B.
The Pennsylvania House of Representatives inserted this language as an amendment. See
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1983 HOUSE LEGIS. J. 2130. This amendment allegedly re-
sponds to a request by the Mack Truck Corporation. See Sell, supra note 11, at 488. At that
time Renault owned options and warrants that would have allowed it to acquire more than
over thirty percent of voting shares, the controlling person must
promptly notify each shareholder of record.259 Moreover, the notice
to shareholders must include a copy of section 910 and the provisions
of the BCL that govern dissenters' rights.26 0
The price that the controlling person must pay to shareholders
who exercise their redemption rights under section 910 differs from
the price that section 515(B) 21 requires a corporation to pay a dis-
senting shareholder.2"2 On the one hand, section 910(E) provides
that the redeeming shareholder receive the fair value of his shares as
of the day prior to the occurrence of a control transaction26 3 plus a
control premium.26 4 On the other hand, valuation of shares under the
ordinary dissenters' rights provision specifically excludes any in-
crease or decrease in value resulting from corporate action.265 Fur-
ther, the dissenters' rights provision requires payment of this value
by the corporation,2 6 but section 910 subjects the controlling person,
who is merely another shareholder, to that duty.
267
Section 910 resembles right of redemption article provisions.2 8
Its deterrent effect on tender offers is similar to that of fair price
provisions in articles of incorporation 269 or section 409.1 of the
BCL. 70 Under section 910 shareholders have little incentive to
tender their shares because they may exercise their redemption
rights "within a reasonable time"2 7' after the acquiror reaches the
50% of Mack's stock. Id.
259. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(C) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
260. Id. Dissenter's rights are governed by § 515 of the BCL, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1515 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984-1985). Section 910(C) of the 1983 Amendments, PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(C) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985), requires inclusion of subsection F through
I of § 515, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515(F)-(I) (Purdon 1967), in the notification to share-
holders. These provisions explain how a shareholder exercises dissenter's rights.
261. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515(B) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). This subsection re-
quires that the corporation pay a dissenting shareholder "the fair value of his shares as of the
day prior to the date on which the vote was taken [on the corporate plan which is the basis of
dissent] without regard to any depreciation or appreciation thereof in consequence of the plan.
.I id.
262. See Sell, supra note 11, at 487.
263. A control transaction occurs when a shareholder becomes a controlling person. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(B)(4). (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). A shareholder becomes a
controlling person when he has the right to vote 30% of the shares entitled to elect directors.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(B) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
264. This term means an "increment representing a proportion of any value payable for
acquisition of control of the corporation." Id. § 1910(E). See supra note 31 and accompanying
text (discussion of an analogous fair price formula in article amendments).
265. See statute cited supra note 261.
266. Section 515 of the BCL, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1515 (Purdon 1967 & Supp.
1984-1985) describes only rights as between a corporation and dissenting shareholders of the
corporation.
267. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 1910(D) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
268. For a discussion of right of redemption article amendments, see supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
271. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(D) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
thirty percent trigger level and notifies shareholders.272 Also, the
tender offeror loses control of the cost of a total acquisition because
he may have to purchase a much higher percentage of the target's
shares at a premium, if too many shareholders exercise their
mandatory redemption rights.273 Additionally, the section's thirty
percent trigger would apply, even if an acquiror did not plan to ac-
quire all shares in the target corporation.
While management is unable to exempt a particular controlling
person from the section's redemption provision, it is able to control
the general applicability of the section. Section 910(A) allows corpo-
rations to render the section inapplicable to themselves by amending
their bylaws within ninety days of the section's enactment date274 or
by article amendment at any time.275 The BCL permits a corpora-
tion to vest power to amend its bylaws in the directors alone.2 76
Thus, before March 22, 1984, directors acting alone could render the
section inapplicable, if the corporation's articles of incorporation per-
mitted them to amend its bylaws. Additionally, shareholders may
render the section inapplicable at any time by amending the articles
of incorporation. 77 If shareholders propose the amendment, they
must do so by a petition representing ten percent of the shares enti-
tled to be voted on article amendments. 8
The interplay between section 910 and federal securities law
poses an additional problem. 279 The problem arises if a group of
shareholders meets to discuss the possibility of a proxy fight.280
Under section 13(d)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934281 a
group coming together "for the purpose of acquiring, holding or dis-
posing of securities of an issuer "282 is a "person" for purposes of
section 13(d).283 Additionally, a section 13(d) group must have an
agreement "in furtherance of a common objective."284 Persons ac-
quiring beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a class of
registered securities must file a Schedule 13D with the Securities
Exchange Commission and the issuer of the securities. 285 Thus, a
272. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Sell, supra note 11, at 489.
274. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(A)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). Since the section
was effective as of the date of its enactment, the 90 day period elapsed on March 22, 1984.
275. Id. § 1910(A)(2).
276. See id. § 1304.
277. Id. § 1910(A)(2).
278. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1802 (Purdon 1967).
279. See Sell, supra note 11, at 488.
280. Id.
281. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1982).
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir. 1982).
285. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982). Rule 13d-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1984)
requires the filing of Schedule 13D. See supra note 42 (describing required disclosure). Rule
shareholder group that comes together to discuss a proxy fight is ar-
guably required to file a Schedule 13D with the corporation."' s Since
Schedule 13D must contain the number of shares controlled by the
group,287 the filing alerts management to the group's existence. If the
shareholder group's holdings exceed thirty percent of the outstanding
shares of a class, section 910's redemption provision becomes appli-
cable.288 Management might then inform shareholders of their re-
demption rights in an attempt to abort the nascent proxy contest.289
D. Summary
The 1983 Amendments are a comprehensive package of mea-
sures designed to protect incumbent management of Pennsylvania
corporations. Section 408 codifies social conscience article amend-
ments and goes far in shielding management from liability to share-
holders for breach of its fiduciary duties.29 ° Under section 408, man-
agement may permissibly consider a broad scope of factors in
making corporate decisions."' Section 409.1, with its supermajority
and fair price provisions, effectively deters any transaction that is
useful to complete a two-step acquisition. 92 Finally, section 910 de-
ters both the first step of a two-step transaction and the mere
purchase of a block of shares that exceeds the section's thirty per-
cent trigger level.
293
VI. The 1983 Amendments and the Constitution
Constitutional attacks on the 1983 Amendments to Pennsylva-
nia's BCL ultimately should enjoy the same success which similar
attacks on takeover disclosure laws met. Although a preemption at-
tack on the 1983 Amendments will almost certainly fail, 294 a chal-
lenger can advance strong arguments that any shareholder protective
effect of the 1983 Amendments is illusory and that the burden on
interstate commerce is substantial.
29 5
13d-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1984) defines "beneficial owner" as including "any person who,
directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or other-
wise has or shares: (a) Voting power which includes the power to vote, or to direct the voting
of such security .... " Id.
286. See Sell, supra note 11, at 488.
287. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1984).
288. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
289. See Sell, supra note 11, at 488.
290. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 245-48 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
294. See infra notes 296-329 and accompanying text.
295. See infra notes 339-403 and accompanying text.
A. Preemption and the 1983 Amendments
The Williams Act does not preempt the 1983 Amendments to
Pennsylvania's BCL. The federal statute neither expressly nor im-
pliedly prohibits state securities regulations.2 96 Furthermore, no fa-
cial conflict exists between the provisions of the Williams Act and
the 1983 Amendments.297 Finally, although the 1983 Amendments
conflict with the neutrality policy of the Williams Act, the preemp-
tive vigor of that policy seems considerably weakened after Edgar v.
MITE Corp.2 98 Thus, when a court compares the Williams Act and
the 1983 Amendments in applying the Hines test, the only congres-
sional purpose which remains undisputed is investor protection.299
The 1983 Amendments contain none of the specific provisions
that conflicted with the Williams Act. The new Pennsylvania law
requires no waiting period or hearings,30 0 both of which conflict with
the congressional policy that tender offers go forward unhindered. 0 1
Furthermore, none of the new provisions substitutes the judgment of
administrative officials for that of investors in determining the fair-
ness of an offer.30 2 Finally, to the extent that the neutrality policy
survives as an incident of Congress' investor protection policy, 30 3 no
provision of the 1983 Amendments is in direct conflict.
304
Section 408(B) conflicts neither with the mechanical provisions
of the Williams Act nor with its investor protection policy. The new
Pennsylvania provision addresses management's fiduciary duties, 06
not tender offers. It has no effect on the timing306 and disclosure"
296. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
297. "A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry
into congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physi-
cal impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce." Florida Lime & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) (citations omitted).
298. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
299. It has been recognized that Congress intended to protect investors when it passed
the Williams Act. See cases and other authorities cited supra note 98.
300. These provisions are analyzed in Justice White's plurality opinion in Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 634-39. See supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of these and other conflicting provisions.
301. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 634; 113 CONG. REC. 854-55, 24665-
66 (1967).
302. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
303. "Neutrality is . . . but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different
purpose - the protection of investors." Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 29
(1977). See also Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes Re-
considered, 88 YALE L.J. 510, 522-23 (1979).
304. The rationale behind case law holding that state statutes favoring target manage-
ment conflicted with the Williams Act was that these provisions allowed management to defeat
tender offers by delay. See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d at 497; Great W. United
Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1277. The 1983 Amendments contain no provisions which delay
tender offers.
305. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
306. Section 13(d)(l) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1982), and Rule
13d-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (1984), require that a person acquiring five percent of a class of
certain equity securities file a Schedule 13D within ten days of the acquisition. Section
provisions of the Williams Act. Management can comply with fed-
eral requirements that it take a position on any offer1 8 while consid-
ering the interests of the nonshareholder constituencies enumerated
in section 408(B). The investor protection policy of the Williams Act
is also untouched. Investors are as well informed 30 9 and as free to
choose to accept or reject a tender offer with section 408(B) as with-
out it.
Section 409.1(C) of the 1983 Amendments also does not apply
to tender offers.3"0 Its supermajority and fair price provisions3 11 ap-
ply only if the interested shareholder attempts a total acquisition in a
two-step transaction. 312 Although the required supermajority ap-
proval must occur at a shareholders' meeting,3 13 any delay caused by
the interval between the second step of the acquisition and the an-
nual or special shareholders' meeting 3 4 at which the vote will occur
does not hinder the initial tender offer. At the time of this meeting
the acquiror has already made the tender offer.
Under section 409.1(C), shareholders may still accept or reject
the initial tender offer. Since the supermajority and fair price provi-
sions of the subsection decrease the shareholders' incentive to tender
in the initial stage of a two-step acquisition,3 15 it may actually en-
hance the investors' freedom to accept or reject an offer. The
supermajority provision allows a corporation's shareholders to ratify
the second step of a two-step acquisition, 31 6 while leaving their
14(d)(1) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(l) (1982), and Rules 14d-1 and 14d-3, 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1, 240.14d-3 (1984), require that tender offerors seeking more than five
percent of a class of certain registered securities file a Schedule 14D. Rule 14d-2(b), 17
C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1984), requires that a tender offeror commence or withdraw a tender
offer within 5 days of public announcement. Rule 14e-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a) (1984),
requires that the target company management make a statement of position regarding a tender
offer within ten days of the offer's publication. Rule 14e-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1984),
requires that an offer remain open for 20 days from its first publication or ten days from notice
of increased consideration.
307. Sections 13d and 14d of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), 78n(d), and Rules
13d-101, 13d-102, 14d-100 and 14d-101, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-101, 240.13d-102, 240.14d-
100 and 240.14d-101 (1984), set forth the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act. See
supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of these requirements.
308. Rule 14e-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2(a) (1984).
309. See supra notes 42-47.
310. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1(C) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985), applies to mergers
with interested shareholders, sales of assets to interested shareholders and dissolutions. See
supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
311. Id. § 1409.1(C)(I)-(2)(ii).
312. For an explanation of two-step transactions, see supra note 19 and the authorities
cited therein.
313. This approval could take place by written consent of the shareholders pursuant to
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1513 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
314. Shareholders' meetings must occur at least annually. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
1501(B) (Purdon 1967). Special meetings of shareholders must occur on at least five days
notice, and within 60 days after requested. Id. §§ 1501(C), 1502.
315. See supra note 245-48 and accompanying text.
316. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1409.1(C) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985), requires
supermajority approval for those transactions commonly used in the second step. See generally
choice in the first step unimpaired.
Section 910 of the 1983 Amendments poses a closer preemption
question. Superficially, the new section does not conflict with the in-
vestor protection policy of the Williams Act;3 17 however, it favors
target management.3 18 The section applies to tender offers, if the of-
feror plans to acquire more than thirty percent of the target's out-
standing voting stock; 319 but nothing in the section hinders the tim-
ing 320 and disclosure 32 1 provisions of the Williams Act. Furthermore,
section 910 affirms investor choice. A shareholder may sell his shares
to anyone at any price z'1 and his invocation of the mandatory re-
demption provision is wholly discretionary.
23
The foregoing observations on section 910 are true only to the
extent that a tender offer is actually made. Section 910 has, how-
ever, a deterrent effect on tender offers. Under the section's
mandatory redemption provision, an offeror who intends to acquire
all of the target's shares has difficulty inducing shareholders to
tender initially324 and potentially loses control over the cost of the
acquisition.3 2 5 In Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly,321 the court
suggests that the Williams Act might preempt state regulation of
tender offers if a challenger could show that the state law halted an
excessive number of offers.327 Proof that a state law has deterred
many tender offers would be extremely difficult to produce.28 Be-
N. Brockmeyer & W. Yerkes, supra note 19 (explaining how these transactions are used).
317. Cf. Gilson, Shark Repellent Amendments, supra note 17, at 802 n.99. Professor
Gilson asserts that mandatory redemption provisions are the type of shark repellent amend-
ment most likely to deter takeover bids and most protective of the minority's interest.
318. See Black & Smith, supra note 17, at 717; Gilson, Shark Repellent Amendments,
supra note 17, at 805 (both noting the management entrenchment aspects of right of redemp-
tion shark repellent amendments). See also DeAngelo & Rice, supra note 23, at 355-56 (em-
pirical evidence that shark repellent amendments entrench incumbent management); contra
Linn & McConnell, supra note 23, at 394-98 (empirical evidence that shark repellent amend-
ments do not entrench incumbent management).
319. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(B), (D)-(E) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). See
also supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
320. For an explanation of the timing provisions of the Williams Act, see supra note
306.
321. For an explanation of the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act, see supra
note 307.
322. "[Nlothing contained in this section shall preclude any shareholder from agreeing
to sell his voting shares at [the fair price specified in subsection E] or any other price to any
person." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(D) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985).
323. "After the occurrence of the control transaction, any holder of voting shares of the
corporation may . . . make written demand on the controlling person . . .for payment of the
amount provided in subsection E .. " Id. (emphasis added).
324. For an explanation of this effect, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
325. For an explanation of this effect, see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
326. 686 F.2d 1029 (lst Cir. 1982).
327. Id. at 1039 n.12.
328. Cf. Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1284. In its Commerce Clause
analysis, the Kidwell court placed greater weight on evidence that Idaho's law blocked a spe-
cific tender offer than on evidence that the law had a general deterrent effect on all tender
offers. Id.
cause courts have been willing to find that a state statute unduly
burdens commerce if it halts a single interstate offer, a29 producing
extensive evidence of many specific instances is arguably
unnecessary.
Accordingly, the Williams Act does not preempt the 1983
Amendments to Pennsylvania's BCL. Sections 408(B) and 409.1(C)
regulate management's fiduciary duties330 and the relationships of
shareholders to the corporation and among themselves. 31 These are
areas of state law that the Williams Act does not address.33 Fur-
thermore, these areas of state law remain unfederalized.3 3 Section
910 does regulate tender offers3 4 and does favor target management;
however, two Justices of the Supreme Court have stated that the
Williams Act's neutrality policy does not imply a congressional in-
tent to prohibit all state regulation of tender offers, even if the state
law protects interests which include those of the target's manage-
ment . 3 3 5 Since Edgar v. MITE Corp.,3 6 courts have relied on the
Commerce Clause 3 7 in striking down state regulation of corporate
takeovers.338
B. The Commerce Clause and the 1983 Amendments
A Commerce Clause339 attack on the 1983 Amendments should
be successful. Pennsylvania's interests in protecting resident share-
holders, regulating the internal affairs of local corporations and pre-
serving benevolent local management are identical to those asserted
in previous takeover disclosure law cases. Although Pennsylvania ar-
guably has a stronger internal affairs argument,3 40 its legitimate in-
terests do not outweigh the substantial burden that the new law im-
329. See cases cited supra note 158 (courts holding that the halting of a single offer,
combined with the global reach of the state laws at issue, unduly burdened commerce).
330. See supra notes 210-21 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 232-39 and accompanying text.
332. The Williams Act regulates tender offers and acquisitions of over five percent of
certain securities, not mergers, sales of assets and dissolutions. For a discussion of the Wil-
liams Act, see supra notes 38-51 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
334. The section's mandatory redemption provision applies whenever a control transac-
tion occurs. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(D) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985). A control transac-
tion occurs whenever a person acquires voting power over 30% of the target's voting stock. Id.
§ 1910(B)(1). Thus, when a tender offeror accepts 30% of the target's voting shares for
purchase, the mandatory redemption provision applies.
335. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 646-47 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in
part); id. at 654-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
336. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
337. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cf. 3.
338. See, e.g., Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983); Mesa Petroleum
Corp. v. Cities Serv. Co., 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1983); Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 690 F.2d 558 (6th Cir. 1982); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 124 N.H. 1, 466 A.2d
919 (1983).
339. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
340. See infra notes 378-88 and accompanying text.
poses on commerce.4
1. Pennsylvania's Interest in Protecting Investors. - Pennsyl-
vania has a legitimate interest in protecting shareholders in local
corporations;3 2 however, this interest does not extend to the protec-
tion of nonresident shareholders. 343 Pennsylvania's legislature un-
doubtedly sought to protect local investors when it passed the 1983
Amendments. 44 Furthermore, the General Assembly was particu-
larly concerned with the plight of investors caught in the second step
of an acquisition. 45 The scope of this law's investor protection suf-
fers, however, from one of the same defects that proved constitution-
ally fatal to other state takeover disclosure laws - overbroadness. 346
Although the 1983 Amendments apply only to Pennsylvania corpo-
rations, 34 7 the stock purchases that trigger section 910's mandatory
redemption provision can occur anywhere. 48 Thus, the 1983 Amend-
ments regulate transactions taking place wholly outside of
Pennsylvania.
Additionally, the 1983 Amendments provide only illusory inves-
tor protection. Superficially, section 409.1(C)'s fair price provision
and section 910's mandatory redemption provision seem to protect
341. See infra notes 392-98 and accompanying text.
342. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982).
343. Id.
344. "[P]erhaps it is time for some state to start protecting the minority shareholders
against pirate raids by these great corporate giants." Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1983
SENATE LEGIS. J. 1431 (remarks of Senator Clarence D. Bell urging passage of the 1983
Amendments).
345. In debates on the 1983 Amendments Senator Vincent J. Fumo explained:
Mr. President [of the Pennsylvania Senate], we also need a bill like this to pro-
tect the shareholders on the back end of a corporate takeover. Everyone admits
that if they are in the beginning and are in the front end and they get a pre-
mium paid for their stock, that is good. Once the magic number is reached,
when control is obtained [by the takeover bidder], the people on the back end
[that is, the second step of the two-step acquisition] get absolutely nothing.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1983 SENATE LEGIS. J. 1431. See also Sell, supra note 11, at
482.
Concern for the shareholder faced with a tender offer that is the first step of a two-step
acquisition is more widespread than the membership of the Pennsylvania General Assembly.
The Securities Exchange Commission has requested comments on possible regulatory propos-
als. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 21079 reprinted in 16 SEC. REG. & LAW REP.
1119 (1984). While concerned about shareholder coercion, id. at 1120, the SEC is also sensi-
tive to the deterrent effect on two-tier takeover bids resulting from such regulation. Id. at
1121. Interestingly, SEC is considering an alternative regulatory proposal which, like § 910 of
the 1983 Amendments, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910 (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985), is based on
Rule 34 of the British City Code of Take-overs and Mergers. Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 21079, reprinted in 16 SEc. REG. & LAW REP. at 1122.
346. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643-44. (Illinois law regulated out-of-
state transactions and therefore imposed a greater burden on interstate commerce than was
necessary.) See also cases cited supra note 158.
347. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1003, 1004 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984-1985);
Sell, supra note 11, at 487.
348. Section 910 addresses stock purchases in Pennsylvania corporations. Nothing in the
section or the BCL limits its application to purchases from resident shareholders.
investors in Pennsylvania corporations."4 9 This is a deceptive impres-
sion, however, because those provisions apply only if a takeover at-
tempt occurs. The 1983 Amendments deter takeover attempts.350 A
challenger can assert substantial arguments that the value of the
shareholder's investment in a corporation will drop if the takeover
mechanism in unavailable.
Large markets for securities tend to be efficient."' 1 Accordingly,
the market rapidly incorporates information about a stock into its
price.352 Thus, in a perfectly efficient market, the price of a stock
and its actual value do not diverge.353 Although the efficiency of cap-
ital markets is sometimes questioned, 354 evidence supports the sound-
ness of the principle,3 55 at least in large markets. Management ineffi-
ciency is one item of information that a stock's price reflects. 35
When all other information is equal, the greater the management
inefficiency, the lower the stock's price.3 57 Correspondingly, when
management becomes more efficient, for example, through replace-
ment, stock prices increase.358 Corporate acquirors are often at-
tracted to poorly managed companies because they believe that they
can replace incumbent management with more efficient management
349. Professor Sell admits that the 1983 Amendments offer shareholders some incidental
protection; however, he asserts that their primary effect is to entrench incumbent management,
which he styles legislative "overkill." See Sell, supra note 11, at 483. See also Gilson, Shark
Repellent Amendments, supra note 17, at 805 (an unavoidable consequence of shark repellent
article amendments is management entrenchment).
350. See supra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
351. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Re-
sponding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital
Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Of-
fers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1978) (both of these articles were cited with approval in Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643-44). For an explanation of the efficient market hypothesis and
its three forms, see J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EvI-
DENCE 70-97 (1973).
352. "The process of estimation and trading leads to prices that embody all of the avail-
able information about the value of the shares." Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 351, at
1165. Professor Fischel explains the efficiency of capital markets by the effects of securities
analysts to discover information which suggests that a security is mispriced, i.e., over-or under-
valued. Trading on this information assures its rapid incorporation into the price of the stock.
See Fischel, supra note 351, at 4.
353. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 351, at 1165-66.
354. See, e.g., Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions
and Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1072, 1120 (1983).
355. Easterbrook & Fischel identify five kinds of evidence that large markets are effi-
cient. First, stock prices are unpredictable, which suggests that prices have adjusted to reflect
any information about their value that is deducible from trends. Second, stock prices adjust
rapidly and accurately when new information about a stock is releaseL; they embody all "pub-
lic" information and more. Third, changes in accounting practices, hence profits, of firms have
no effect on stock prices. Fourth, market professionals do not outperform the market. Last,
SEC disclosure requirements do not benefit investors; returns are no greater now than they
were before SEC's establishment. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 351, at 1166 n.15.
356. See, e.g., Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 841; Manne, Mergers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110 (1965).
357. See Manne, supra note 356, at 112.
358. See Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 341-42.
at a cost below the predicted consequent rise in value of the
target. 59
The four basic methods of displacing incumbent management360
are merger,361 sale of assets,3"2 proxy contests 63 and direct purchase
of shares.3 64 Merger and the sale of assets require incumbent man-
agement's cooperation, because in both types of transactions man-
agement must approve the transaction, pass a resolution and submit
it to a shareholder vote. 65 Effectively, a proxy contest also requires
similar cooperation because incumbent management may use the
corporation's resources to oppose the proxy, 66 and because an aver-
age shareholder will be unable to recoup costs of waging the contest
even if he prevails.36 7 Thus, a direct purchase of shares in the target
is the preferred method of acquiring control when target manage-
ment opposes the takeover.36 8
359. Id. The market price of a poorly run corporation will fall no lower than its highest
potential price minus the transaction costs of the offer. See Smiley, Tender Offers, Transaction
Costs and the Theory of the Firm, 58 REV. ECON. & STAT. 22, 24 (1976). Based on a sample
of 95 tender offers, Smiley found that transaction costs of the offer were approximately 13% of
the target's post-offer price. Id. at 30.
Grossman and Hart suggest that no tender offer can succeed unless the price offered is
greater than the target shareholders' perception of the target's postacquisition value. Grossman
& Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, II BELL
J. ECON. 42, 45-46 (1980). Tender offer prices are controlled by the target's value to the
acquiror. Thus, tender offers will be made only when the acquiror's estimate of the target's
value exceeds the costs of making the offer plus the target shareholders' estimate of the ex-
pected increase in value of their investment after the takeover. Id. at 46.
360. See Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 842; Fischel, supra note
351, at 5-6.
361. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1901 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984-1985).
362. See id. § 1311.
363. See id. §§ 1503, 1504.
364. See Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 842; see also Fischel, supra
note 351, at 5-6; Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Controlk The Scientific Evi-
dence, II J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6-7 (1983).
365. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1311, 1901 (Purdon 1967 & Supp. 1984-
1985). These sections require director approval and passage of a resolution recommending the
dissolution or merger to the shareholders.
366. See Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 843; Fischel, supra note
351, at 6-7. Professor Gilson observes:
Proxy contests cannot be dismissed entirely, however. They do in fact occur,
and management does occasionally lose. The occasional occurrence of a proxy
fight may be accounted for by the lower capital cost of the transaction. While a
tender offer presents a more attractive investment, it is available only if the addi-
tional funds necessary to purchase the shares can be obtained.
Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 843 n.95.
367. See Clark, Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 CASE W. L. REV. 776, 779-80
(1979). A proxy contest is expensive to wage. If the challenger is unsuccessful, he has nothing
to show for his efforts. The unsuccessful tender offer, however, has a block of shares, the sale
of which will at least partially offset the costs of the offer. See E. ARANOW & EINHORN,
PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, 569-81 (2d ed. 1968).
368. See Gilson, Shark Repellent Amendments, supra note 17, at 820; Gilson, A Struc-
tural Approach, supra note 225, at 842; Fischel, supra note 351, at 5-6.
Empirical studies also indicate that successful tender offers generate greater returns for
target shareholders than do successful negotiated mergers. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note
364, at 8-22 (collecting and summarizing empirical results).
Because modern corporate statutes repose control of negotiated
takeovers in incumbent management, a"9  Pennsylvania's 1983
Amendments effectively weaken a strong check on management inef-
ficiency by deterring takeover attempts.3 70 Ownership of a modern
corporation resides in shareholders, but management resides in their
agents, the managers. 371 Thus, the benefit of the managers' work in-
ures to the shareholders.37 2 Without a monitoring mechanism, man-
agers, like all persons, act in their own interest and take more re-
ward than promised, either by being inefficient or by appropriating a
disproportionate share of the corporation's income stream.3 73 The
threat of a takeover is a necessary monitoring mechanism.3 74 The
1983 Amendments remove this effective monitoring mechanism and
allow greater management inefficiency. Because the securities mar-
ket incorporates the resultant increases in management inefficiency
into the target corporation's share price, the 1983 Amendments ulti-
mately depress the value of the shareholders' investment in Pennsyl-
vania corporations.37 5 This detriment to shareholders is in addition to
the loss of the opportunity to tender their shares at a premium if a
tender offer is never made.376 Thus, the 1983 Amendments effec-
369. See supra notes 363-67 and accompanying text.
370. See Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpora-
tion, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 287-88 (1977).
Professor Winter states that state legislation which deters takeovers monopolizes the mar-
ket for management control. He argues that this monopolization allows greater management
discretion to self-deal, thus depressing stock prices. Depressed stock prices will ordinarily lead
to replacement of management; however, when state takeover statutes increase the cost of
takeovers, this disciplinary effect on management is weaker. Id.
37 1. See Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 834-35; Fischel, supra note
351, at 8.
372. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 351, at 1170.
373. Because individual managers do not receive the full benefit of their work, each may
free-ride, that is, depend on other managers to cure any inefficiency in his own work. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 351, at 1170. Free-riding by managers results in manage-
rial inefficiency or appropriation of the corporation's income steam for perquisites. See Gilson,
A Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 837.
For an explanation of the "agency costs of outside equity," i.e. how management's and
shareholders' interests diverge, see Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-330 (1976).
374. Grossman and Hart rigorously describe the disciplinary effect of the takeover
mechanism on management efficiency. See Grossman & Hart, supra note 359, at 47-50. See
also Jensen & Ruback, supra note 364 at 29-30.
There are also other monitoring mechanisms. Bonuses, salaries, pensions, shareholder
monitoring, monitoring by other managers and monitoring by the capital markets all exert a
disciplinary effect on management efficiency. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 351, at
1171-72; Gilson, A Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 837-40. Gilson argues that the
market for corporate control exerts this disciplinary effect at the lowest cost. See Gilson, A
Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 839-40.
375. For a discussion of how the market incorporates information, including manage-
ment inefficiency, into share price, see supra notes 351-59 and accompanying text.
For empirical data showing the increase in value of target company stock that results
from successful and unsuccessful tender offers, see Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and Stock-
holder Returns, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 351 (1977).
376. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 643.
tively harm, rather than protect, the interest of shareholders in
Pennsylvania corporations."' 7
2. Pennsylvania's Interest in Regulating the Internal Affairs
of Local Corporations. - Pennsylvania's interest in regulating the
internal affairs of local corporations is arguably stronger under the
1983 Amendments than was the similar interest of those states
whose takeover disclosure laws fell to Commerce Clause attacks. 78
The 1983 Amendments govern only Pennsylvania corporations. 79
Section 408(B) and 409.1(C) do not regulate tender offers 80 but do
regulate areas traditionally governed by state law.38' Section 910,
however, does apply to tender offers,38 2 which are not within the am-
bit of a corporation's internal affairs.3 8 3 The transfer of shares in a
tender offer effects changes neither in the corporation,38 4 nor in the
legal attributes of the shares themselves.3 8, 5 Furthermore, the legal
relationship 8 ' between the corporation and the new owner of the
shares is identical to the relationship between the corporation and
the old owner.3 8 7 Finally, tender offers are distinguishable from
proxy contests. In the former transaction the offeror acquires both
the share and its vote; in the latter transaction the proxy solicitor
acquires only the vote."' Thus, the 1983 Amendments overstep the
bounds of corporate internal affairs in their protection of this state
interest.
3. Pennsylvania's Interest in Keeping Corporation in the
State. - Pennsylvania's interest in preserving the benefits of benevo-
lent local management is legitimate.389 There are, however, less re-
377. See id. at 644; cf. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 525 (1959)
(contoured mudgards purportedly required as a safety measure actually increased road
danger).
378. Some commentators have suggested that the target's state of incorporation has a
stronger interest in regulating takeovers. See authorities cited supra note 165. See also Special
Report, 16 SEC. REG. & LAW REPORT 1392, 1394 (1984) (ABA Committee on State Regula-
tion of Securities" panel discussion) (suggesting that the "state of incorporation" jurisdictional
basis warrants more judicial deference).
379. See supra note 347.
380. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1408(B), 1409.1(C) (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985), govern
the fiduciary duties of management and certain fundamental corporate transactions with inter-
ested shareholders. See supra notes 219-48 and accompanying text.
381. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
382. See supra note 334.
383. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. at 645; Great W. United v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d
at 1280 n.53.




388. Id. See also Note, Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender
Offers, supra note 166, at 1154.
389. For a discussion of this state interest, see supra notes 175-78 and accompanying
text.
strictive alternative means to protect this interest, such as tax incen-
tives for charitable deductions, environmental legislation and civic
involvement programs. 9 ' The state's interest in hindering the emi-
gration of local corporations by shielding them from takeovers is not
a legitimate interest.3 91
4. The 1983 Amendments and Burdens on Commerce. - The
burden that the 1983 Amendments impose on commerce is less obvi-
ous than that imposed by state takeover disclosure laws. In those
cases, precommencement filing requirements, hearings and the state
administrator's power to entirely stop tender offers prevented offers
that the offeror clearly intended to make.3 92 The 1983 Amendments,
like the shark repellent article amendments that they codify,393 deter
tender offers before the offeror makes a firm decision to proceed .39
A hypothetical example illustrates this effect.
Fresser Corporation, a snack food company incorporated in Del-
aware, is considering the total acquisition of Leckerbissen Corpora-
tion, a pretzel manufacturer incorporated in Pennsylvania to which
section 910 applies. Leckerbissen's directors rebuff Fresser's initial
attempt to negotiate a merger. Fresser is willing to pay 36,000,000
dollars for Leckerbissen. 395 Leckerbissen currently has 1,000,000
390. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1286.
391. See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d at 1282. The General Assembly
seems to have had this interest in mind when it passed the 1983 Amendments. Senator Vincent
J. Fumo said:
This bill would basically protect the corporations that are in Pennsylvania.
This bill would prevent foreign interests from coming in and taking over
Pennsylvania corporations and obliterating those corporations, putting them out
of business, milking their assets, milking their cash and, in the end, increasing
unemployment because of the people who they would lay off after the mergers
were consummated.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1983 SENATE LEGIS. J. 1431. For an effective rebuttal to this
type of argument, see Note. Commerce Clause Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender
Offers, supra note 166, at 1158. Later, Senator Vincnet J. Fumo used more hortative
language:
I urge all Members of this Senate to vote in favor of this bill this time so we can
give a very clear message to the business community, the labor community and
to the entire nation that businesses do, in fact, have a friend in Pennsylvania,
and that friend is its Legislature who can respond to corporate needs when they
are in the best interest of all the citizens of Pennsylvania.
Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania, 1983 SENATE LEGIS. J. 1524.
392. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624. For a collection of the cases, see
supra note 95.
393. For a discussion of the types of shark repellents codified in the 1983 Amendments.
see supra notes 17-37 and accompanying text.
394. "Tender offer decisions, like all business choices, are made at the margin. An in-
crease in acquisition costs resulting from shark repellent amendments need not alone make a
proposed acquisition undesirable; it need only be the last straw." Gilson, Shark Repellent
Amendments, supra note 17, at 804.
395. In an efficient market the target's stock is not undervalued; however, a target com-
pany may have unique worth to the acquiror because of the opportunity to combine operations
and financing, as well as the opportunity to install more efficient management. See Gilson, A
shares of common stock outstanding. These shares trade at thirty
dollars per share; thus the market price of 100 percent of Leckerbis-
sen's stock is 30,000,000 dollars. This common stock is Leckerbis-
sen's only equity security.
Fresser considers a two-step acquisition. In the first step it plans
to acquire fifty-one percent of Leckerbissen's outstanding common
stock, totalling 510,000 shares. It will offer forty dollars per share, a
ten dollar premium over Leckerbissen's thirty dollar per share mar-
ket price. Thus, the cost to Fresser of the first step of the acquisition
will be 510,000 shares multiplied by the forty dollar per share offer-
ing price, or 20,400,000 dollars. Fresser then plans to elect friendly
directors to Leckerbissen's board of directors and negotiate a merger
in which the 490,000 share minority will receive thirty dollars cash
per share for its interest. The cost of the second step to Fresser will
be 490,000 shares multiplied by the thirty dollar per share merger
price or 14,700,000 dollars. Thus the total acquisition will cost
Fresser 35,100,000 dollars.
Because section 910 applies to this acquisition, Fresser's total
potential cost is 1,000,000 shares multiplied by forty dollars, or
40,000,000 dollars. During the first step, tender offer Fresser will
exceed section 910's thirty percent trigger and become subject to the
Leckerbissen shareholders' redemption rights. Thus, Fresser's poten-
tial cost for Leckerbissen exceeds its worth by nearly 6,000,000
dollars.
Section 910 deters Fresser in two ways. First, Fresser's control
over the cost of the acquisition vanishes.3 96 Leckerbissen's forty-nine
percent minority controls the acquisition's potential cost by its ability
to redeem its shares under section 910. Second, even if Fresser de-
cided to take this risk and proceed with its tender offer,
3 97 it will
have difficulty mustering fifty-one percent of the shares to gain legal
control. The shareholders have little incentive to tender into the first
step because section 910 guarantees that they will receive an equal
Structural Approach, supra note 225, at 853.
For descriptions of acquiror motives to attempt a takeover, see Bradley, Desai & Kim,
The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983); Halpern, Corpo-
rate Acquisitions: A Theory of Special Cases? A Review of Event Studies Applied to Acquisi-
tions, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 297 (1983).
396. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
397. Fresser might decide to make its offer for 51% conditional on no more than two or
three percent of the remaining shares being redeemed. Section 910(F) of the 1983 Amend-
ments, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1910(F) (Purdon Supp. 1984-85), permits this. See Sell,
supra note 11, at 487. A riskier gambit would be making an offer for 40% of Leckerbissen's
shares, conditioned on no more than 11% of the shares being redeemed. Professor Sell suggests
that § 910 subjects the acquiror to the shareholders' redemption rights only once. Id. Thus, if
Leckerbissen's shareholders tendered or redeemed less than 51% of that corporation's shares,
Fresser could make another tender offer or open market purchase to acquire 51% without
triggering the shareholders' redemption rights.
price on demand after Fresser accumulates thirty percent of Leck-
erbissen's shares. 9 " Fresser will look elsewhere for an acquisition
and Leckerbissen's shareholders will lose an opportunity to sell their
shares at a premium.
5. The Balance of Burdens and Benefits. - The 1983 Amend-
ments should fall to a Commerce Clause" attack. The General As-
sembly sought to protect Pennsylvania's interests in protecting local
shareholders, regulating corporate internal affairs and preserving the
benefit of benevolent local management. Although these are legiti-
mate state interests, Pennsylvania's approach is overbroad because
the 1983 Amendments regulate transactions that occur entirely
outside of the state400 and exceed the scope of corporate internal af-
fairs.401 Furthermore, the 1983 amendments arguably harm, rather
than help, local investors' interests.40 2 Less restrictive alternative
means protect the state's interest in corporate social responsibility.40 3
Substantial burdens on commerce outweigh these interests. The 1983
Amendments deter tender offers. This deterrent effect robs share-
holders of the opportunity to tender their shares at a premium and
depresses the value of shares in Pennsylvania corporations.
VI. Conclusion
The 1983 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Business Corpora-
tion Law, enacted in response to Edgar v.-MITE Corp.,4 °4 are an
attempt to cure the constitutional defects of state takeover regulation
by codifying three shark repellent articles provisions. In part, the at-
tempt succeeds. The 1983 Amendments are not preempted by the
Williams Act. Further, the social conscience and fair price provisions
in the new law only incidentally regulate tender offers and do not
exceed the scope of Pennsylvania's interest in regulating the internal
affairs of local corporations. Accordingly, these provisions will with-
stand a Commerce Clause challenge. Section 910, however, imposes
too great a burden on commerce. It effectively deters nationwide
tender offers for Pennsylvania corporations. Because the section
harms rather than helps local investors, applies to investors outside
the state and regulates transactions beyond the scope of corporate
internal affairs, local interests cannot outweigh the burden on com-
398. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
399. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 2.
400. See supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 382-88 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 369-77 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 389-90 and accompanying text.
404. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
merce. Thus, at least section 910 of the 1983 Amendments should
fall to a Commerce Clause challenge.
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